This blog is dedicaded to the text that comes from academician V.Legasov audio tapes which he recorded after the Chernobyl accident and not long before his death.
… it should be obvious even to a humanist that if power builds up at a
certain rate, if it so happens that a problem escalates at a certain speed,
then it is obvious that the protection system must act faster than this
problem grows in the system. But theirs was five to six times slower.
Adamovich: [UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTION]
Legasov: Yes, the reactivity increases by 13 times every second whereas the
rod takes five or six seconds to descend. So they directed all their efforts
towards harmonizing these speeds to make a dry channel. This is how much
they clung to those bloody rods, mechanical, with the help of which… And
they still can’t let go of them, while my proposal for gas-based protection
was pushed to sometime in the distant future. And now it appears that it is
impossible to make the rods move that fast after all. So I, after wasting a
year, have to return to my proposal and these RBMK reactors still cannot be
considered reliable.
Adamovich: [UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTION]
Legasov: RBMK? 14 of them. All through, I want to tell you, and I don’t know
if I am succeeding, that it is just about the philosophy of safety. Had the
philosophy of safety been correct, then our experts would have, without a
doubt, found technical solutions conforming to this philosophy. Because they
are competent specialists, sensible people; they can make calculations and
have other skills. But the problem is that they were put in such a
situation. If the philosophy had specified mandatory containment, we would
not have the RBMK reactor and this conversation wouldn’t be. Neither would
there be 14 VVER devices “naked”, covered by nothing. And if a VVER
explodes, and it can explode, the footprint would not be 80-90 kilometres;
it would be 250 kilometres.
Adamovich: [UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTION]
Legasov: No, we have 14 VVER devices without containments.
Adamovich: [UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTION]
Legasov: No, 14 RBMKs without containments and 14 VVERs without
containments.
And only when we had the containments, the stations being built for the last
5-6 years, the ones being designed now, and the ones that will be built, all
are being built with containments. Where did this come from? As soon as we
started selling stations to the Finns. The Finns, according to international
requirements, said, “Give us containment; we won’t take it without
containment.” And then came our first station with containment. And it is
very good judging by its reactor parameters, and it is with containment.
This makes it the best station in the world, “Loviisa”. After that, we
started implementing this philosophy here. That is why the stations being
built in the last 5-6 years, the
Zaporizhia station in
Ukraine... By the way, the station that was built near Minsk
would have been built with containment.
Adamovich: [UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTION]
Legasov: Well, the decision has already been made, an emotional one, so to
say. But I should tell you that the Minsk station, in particular, wouldn’t
pose any danger.
Adamovich: [UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTION]
Legasov: Well, that is understandable. The decision has been made and what
can we say about it now. But, in reality, there could be an accident. The
reactor could explode. Anything can happen. But everything will remain
inside the containment. This is what makes the Minsk station and the Finnish
station distinct. Same as the Americans. They had an accident worse than
this but everything remained inside the containment.
So this is the first violation of the philosophy.
What is the fault of Anatoly Pavlovich Alexandrov? The fault of Anatoly
Pavlovich Alexandrov is that he, albeit reluctantly, consented. He was
against it, objected to it together with the experts, but then went on to
meet the stubborn requirements of State Planning Committee and the Ministry
of Energy, that stations can be built without containments. At first, he
opposed it greatly, he fought—and I can prove this documentarily—but then he
gave up. But under what conditions? Under the mandatory condition of the
most rigorous compliance with all regulations and such. And for the last 20
years, he spoke wherever he could, at the Politburo, etc. He demanded
military acceptance; he demanded an improvement in the quality of equipment
and so on. So he was fighting to make the likelihood of an accident at a
station, knowing that there is no containment, minimal. He fought for it.
But yet, he, how should I tell you, well, didn’t want to die for this
philosophy. This is his only fault. There is no other. Because in all other
cases, he fought for the right things, even though it was difficult to
fight. Because a group of experts—who, you know, are like “hurrah, go,
go!”—they had so much influence that Sidorenko Viktor Alekseyevich, the
director of the Department of Nuclear Reactors at our institute, the author
of this doctoral dissertation and this book, was expelled from the
institute. He had to leave the institute. Because his own colleagues didn’t
understand him. But why didn’t they understand him? Because his colleagues
got bonuses from the Ministry; because the institute was part of the
Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Do you understand? They see the
director, who is a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, and
their [own] salary is lousy. If he doesn’t get a bonus of 100 roubles, he
will survive. But I get only 180 and for me, a bonus of 100 roubles is
important. If I “squeal” about the cost of these containments, then I will
not get a bonus. If I say something wrong, I will not be published and my
dissertation will fail.
This is how his own subordinates, brought up for years with such an ideology
in that Ministry, could kick out their own superior. How? Well, they didn’t
kick him out but made his work environment intolerable. However, he,
together with Anatoly Petrovich, fought for quality once they lost with the
containments. And he did a lot to bring about Gosatomenergonadzor, where he
eventually went to work, to the organization that at least controlled the
composition of the equipment that went there. Such were the conditions.
This is why Chernobyl—now do you see why I started from so far back?—it
demonstrated that in the Soviet Union, even today after having survived
Chernobyl, not a single dog understands this philosophy, that is so basic
and simple, the three components of which I told you, even in the nuclear
. And it has not been carried over to the chemical industry, where we could
have a Bhopal at
any moment, you see, because of this very reason of the wrong philosophy.
There is not a single organization in the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet
Union or in the national academies that could develop this philosophy. There
is no capability to use the theory of risk and reliability of devices to
anticipate possible consequences of such events and to prepare for them in
advance.
So we have Chernobyl. As Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov said in the Politburo
meeting on the 14th of July when discussing the issue, “I have the
impression that the country was slowly and steadily moving towards Chernobyl
while developing its nuclear energy.” He was absolutely correct. We were
moving towards Chernobyl. Only it should have happened, in my opinion, not
at Chernobyl but at the Kola station, and a few years earlier; when it was
discovered that in the main pipeline that carries the coolant, the welder,
to get a bonus and to finish faster, just put electrodes inside and lightly
welded them on top instead of welding the valve in the most critical spot.
This was miraculously discovered and this, the most powerful disaster... we
would have just lost the entire Kola Peninsula. And this could have happened
a few years ago. And just by a miracle, it didn’t. And a station without
containment would have
contaminated everything. And our Kola Peninsula, a natural wonder, would have been destroyed.
I want to tell you all this so that you understand that the origin of the
Chernobyl tragedy was in wrong philosophy which resulted from losing 10
years. And then to catch up, quickly, this option was proposed.
Then the transfer, unwarranted transfer of experience from the military
industry to domestic infrastructure. The transfer was entirely unjustified.
Because in the military industry, with a limited number of devices, strict
military acceptance at multiple times—military acceptance at the
manufacturer, military acceptance during the operation—multiple
examinations, staff retraining, etc… And when you suddenly, with the same
device, enter the domestic infrastructure where there is nothing similar—no
simulators, no training systems, no training systems at all, not to mention
the training systems for emergencies. Do you understand? This is how the
conditions for such disasters were created. This is what I want to tell you
today. But this is not for publication yet because they will take both your
and my head off; mine first and then yours. Because nothing has changed so
far.
Adamovich: That is what
Adamov
already told me, and
Velikhov
said the same. In fact, everything continues by inertia. I said the same to
them but how can one get access to Gorbachev for a back-and-forth. They told
me about their complete helplessness.
Legasov: Our general helplessness is again associated with the fact, and
lies in the fact, that as long as there is a monopoly of a particular
institution over the system, it will continue. For example, the Politburo
correctly decided to create a relevant nuclear organization within the
Academy of Sciences; because there is no alternative, no competition. But
not everyone is in a hurry. The same is with Velikhov, for example. He,
knowing this, is not in a hurry to create a strong and appropriate alternate
organization.
Adamovich: [UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTION] ... and which system controls all this
apart from the Academy?
Legasov: Ministry of Medium Machine Building. It has everything. It has all
the designers; everyone remained with them, whereas the Ministry of Energy
is purely an operational institution. It only handles the operation, nothing
more.
The Ministry of Power Engineering was the one who designed the equipment.
The situation worsened because earlier there was the Ministry of Power
Engineering which only made nuclear equipment. Now it has merged with
Minmash. And nuclear equipment has become just one in a range of
manufactured items. So the situation has only worsened. The probability of
[another] Chernobyl has now increased.
Right now, I’m writing a note to Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, another one,
where I say the same thing. “The probability increases day by day because
of…” again, those devices without containment.
Adamovich: Which exist…
Legasov: …which exist. And people understand that they are dangerous. But
what are they doing? They are trying to increase the reliability of the
reactor so that there would not be an accident. But what does this
‘increasing the reliability of the reactor’ mean? It means adding more and
more instruments to it, some additional diagnostics tools and so on.
Moreover, this is being done on different devices at different times. And
staff migration is quite high. So changes to the regulation are introduced
for one device but not for another. On this, they do; on that, they don’t.
Can you imagine? A shift manager moves from one facility to another thinking
that things will be the same. Do you understand? That is why it is more
probable now. Because people think they are doing a good thing by increasing
the reliability of the device. But in reality, due to a lack of
understanding of this whole philosophy, they are worsening the condition of
the device.
Adamovich: [PART OF AN UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE] ...I understand that it is
useless to write…
Legasov: Hope this isn’t confusing to you. It is only for myself. Just in
case it is useful when you write. This means that it applies, in no less
degree but more, to the chemical facilities where we still have such
ugliness, much more than in the nuclear industry. And I sit and shiver.
Indeed, even a person here is ill and I am lying down. Thank God, I am
already cured. I feel sick thinking about exactly what is most likely to
happen to us in the near future. So I just say what I’m afraid of, and I
already am afraid. Because I already spoke at the Politburo once. I said
that the next disaster will happen in South Kazakhstan, with phosphorus,
when everything that lives within a 300-kilometre radius will die.
Adamovich: [UNINTELLIGIBLE SPEECH]
Legasov: But I said so at the Politburo. It went in one ear and out the
other. But two weeks later, it happens in America,
in two weeks. And then they paid attention. Do you understand? Thank God
that it did not happen here or in a factory but on a railway tanker car
transporting phosphorus. They had to evacuate 30,000 people because of this
accident. So I just know that the next nuclear accident will be at the
Armenian plant and the whole of Armenia will be affected. Then the next most
likely is Bulgaria, Kozloduy. And the next most likely is Leningrad; it will
certainly explode. These are the three nuclear stations. There will be a
major chemical accident in Dzerzhinsk. It will be the largest chemical
accident in history. And another big accident will be in Kuibyshev, a
chemical accident. And in Shymkent in South Kazakhstan, there will
definitely be an accident.
Adamovich: I will note all this down. And then…
Legasov: Check that. [dictates] Nuclear:
Armenian,
Leningrad, and
Kozloduy, Bulgaria—these nuclear power stations that don’t have containments. Now
the chemical accidents: an explosion at
Dzerzhinsk,
there will be a powerful explosion; then the same volumetric explosion at
Kuibyshev and Shymkent at a phosphorus plant. An accident is possible in
which
organophosphorus compounds
form, a single breath of which is lethal. Based on the wind rose, on
dispersion, within a radius of 300 kilometres, with entry into China, all
life will be destroyed.
All this is what I say [will happen] unless the necessary measures are
taken. Moreover, the measures that can be taken to prevent this from
happening are known. But the most demoralizing part, which makes one worried
and sick, is that the measures needed are known. For example, I actually can
today…
[ERASED]
...so, it means that the information came in a standard form. The system for
warning the Ministry of Energy about an accident was adopted beforehand,
long before the accident. And it was a coded system. The information came as
a code. For example, certain numbers are sent: 1-2-3-4. 1 is a fire; 2 is
radiation damage; 3 is a nuclear accident; 4 is a chemical hazard.
And teams had already been put in place beforehand. In case of such and such
signal, at such and such place, assemble a specific emergency team to
dispatch here in Moscow. In case of another situation, another team will
assemble and so on. And so, on the night of the 26th of April, all four
types of codes for all types of possible hazards appeared at the Ministry of
Energy. There was a team for this. Accordingly, the Minister was called
immediately, and all the listed experts who had to depart were summoned.
Since this happened on the night between Friday and Saturday, some were at
their dachas. So this process took two to three hours. But, at night,
everyone gathered at the Ministry of Energy. Then another hour or so passed
as the situation with the plane was ascertained, and this group of people
flew out early in the morning to the location. I was not with this group
when they left. And here, an unpleasant moment occurred.
They established a telephone connection and we started receiving information
from the station contrary to the coded signals, not supporting them and even
contradicting them. They started to say that they turned the cooling on,
turned this or that on. This gave the impression that the reactor was live,
that something serious had certainly happened.
In the morning, they had already reported that two people had died. But it
was reported in such a way that one of them died from physical trauma while
the second from chemical burns. Because there really was a fire. That was
true indeed. One they just lost and—
Adamovich: [faintly audible] And he remained there.
Legasov: He remained there, buried in the sarcophagus, while the second one
did actually die from chemical burns because a fire broke out in an area.
But, at the same time, they didn’t report other things like the appearance
of typical radiation injuries and so on. And during the first half of the
day of the 26th, we were receiving such information that the staff are
trying to deal with the situation that has arisen, that the device is out of
control, and they are trying to get it back under control. This, roughly
speaking, was the situation. But since the original signal was serious, the
information was relayed to the Government and it established the Government
Commission.
Adamovich: Who sent the first signal? They themselves?
Legasov: The station staff. The station director. So, on Saturday, early in
the morning around ten, I went to the party meeting, where Slavsky, our
elderly Minister of Medium Machine Building, was speaking.
Adamovich: What’s his name and patronymic?
Legasov: Efim Pavlovich.
Adamovich: He was the Minister of…?
Legasov: Medium Machine Building.
Adamovich: Medium, noting.
Legasov: So he presented a big report; he always made long reports. He
praised nuclear energy, praised himself, praised his own Ministry, and said
in passing, “...at Chernobyl, we have had a signal. Something has happened
but we, as always, will handle it.” and went on with his report. He finished
his report. There was a break at 12 o’clock as I remember it now. During
this break, Slavsky’s First Deputy, Meshkov Alexander Grigorievich, his
First Deputy who was later fired because of this accident—
Adamovich: And he himself? He simply retired?
Legasov: Slavsky?
Adamovich: Yes.
Legasov: Well, how should I put this. They retired him. [They made him
retire.]
Adamovich: Oh, I see. It was like that.
Legasov: Yes, it seems to be civilized. He left without punishment, so to
say.
And so Meshkov Alexander Grigorievich came up to me and said that a
Government Commission had been appointed and that I was included in it. And
that I must be at Vnukovo, at the airport, at 4 o’clock to fly out. The head
of the Government Commission was Boris Yevdokimovich Shcherbina. I
immediately jumped into the car, went to the Institute and found experts on
this type of reactor. I repeat that I myself am not a reactor man despite
being the First Deputy Director of the Institute. But the Institute is huge.
There is thermonuclear and nuclear physics, isotope separation and usage,
radiochemistry and whatever the hell else.
My responsibilities included chemical physics, and separation of isotopes
and substances, as well as the use of nuclear energy in the domestic
infrastructure in the form of isotopes or something else. My department was
the smallest. Apparently, that is why Anatoly Petrovich appointed me as the
First Deputy, because I had no greed to pull resources towards my own tasks.
Among the “giants”, among the reactor people or the thermonuclear people, I
was the smaller, so to say, proprietor. That is why he put me in charge of
management affairs, of resource management. He assigned me the post of the
First Deputy and I worked for them for many years. I think it was out of
these considerations; perhaps he had other considerations.
Anyway, I called the experts with the drawings of the reactor and all the
information that could be gathered. Of course, I did understand the design
of this reactor but not in as much detail as a member of the Government
Commission would need to in such an emergency. I took all that I could carry
with me and at 4 o’clock, I was at the airport. Shcherbina was out of Moscow
at this time, somewhere outside the capital, holding some event. We waited
for him. He arrived. I looked at the composition of the Government
Commission—I can list this first composition if needed—and we flew out to
Kiev.
On the way, I told Shcherbina the story of the accident at Three Mile Island
in detail. This is what I did on the flight. I told him what had happened at
Three Mile Island in America, what events took place there and what measures
[were taken]. And the measures there were simple. They ran away. And didn’t
go near that Three Mile Island station for three years. This is all they
did. Well, actually, they did struggle to keep the hydrogen bubble from
exploding. They were ventilating the hydrogen bubble. Having done that, they
closed the entire thing and for three years, no one even went near the
station. They lost 17 people there, the Americans. But not in the accident
itself. In the accident, no one was killed or exposed to radiation. But
because of panic. There was panic in the town. They rushed to their cars to
evacuate themselves and, in the process, 17 people died in cars. This is how
the Americans fled. And I told this story to
.
We arrived at Kiev. There, led by
Liashko, the head of the Ukrainian Government, was a huge crowd of black
limousines. Gloomy faces. No one could explain what had happened. They said
that things were probably bad. We got into the cars and set off. The journey
was gloomy. There was no definite information. So the conversation was in
the form of “Do you know?” “Yes” or “No”. I was in the same car as the head
of Kiev Oblast Executive Committee,
Plyushch, who was
also a part of the Government Commission. What conversation was there to
have?
Here, the measure of our ignorance, the measure of our misunderstanding of
what had happened was expressed in such instances. That I, for example, even
managed to drop by home to tell my wife that I was leaving on a business
trip. But because I had been at the meeting dressed in my best suit, my best
clothes, I left in the same clothes.
Adamovich: But you did understand?
Legasov: Oh well, I… That’s how much we were confused by the scale of the
accident. Do you understand? To such as extent that I could not imagine the
scale of this accident from the available information. And I have seen more
than one accident. I already had 180 roentgens in me and, thank God, I knew
how to act in situations like these. And the cavalcade of black cars,
Chaikas and others,
that were going there also reflected how little we knew and
. It bore witness to that. Then, Shcherbina, after returning from there,
smashed his deputation badge with a hammer before our own eyes. So that no
one could use it. So contaminated it was that he personally smashed it to
pieces with a hammer. Nothing else bothered him. Anyway… Also, there was an
episode that I will talk about later.
We drove through Chernobyl. It lived a peaceful life, quietly, very
peacefully. We arrived at Pripyat. A few kilometres before Pripyat… There
are 18 kilometres between Chernobyl and Pripyat. So a few kilometres before
Pripyat, say seven or eight, for the first time, I could not recognize a
nuclear station. Because a nuclear power plant is easily distinguishable
because of chimneys that don’t emit anything. Do you understand? This is the
most distinctive feature of a nuclear facility when there is a chimney but
it only serves to draw air from which only Krypton-85 is extracted, as I
told you, and nothing else. And everything around is clean. But here,
suddenly, there was a crimson glow in half the sky and white smoke streaming
out of the reactor. This is not a nuclear station. My first impression was
that I hadn’t come to a nuclear station.
We drove up to the building of the Pripyat City Committee of the Party,
placed ourselves in a hotel nearby, where we stayed for about ten days in
Pripyat itself, but the headquarters—
Adamovich: And the people had already been evacuated. They were taken away
on Sunday.
Legasov: No. We arrived on the 26th at 8.20 pm. And at 8.40 pm,
approximately, the first meeting of the Government Commission was held in
Pripyat itself in the city committee of the party. This first meeting was
simple and straightforward. Shcherbina assigned the duties.
He instructed Meshkov to gather a group of specialists, to be called from
Moscow if needed, and investigate the cause of the accident. He charged me
with developing the measures for liquidation; in other words, what to do. I
was tasked with coming up with proposals on what to do. Suggestions. Because
the final decisions were taken collectively by the Government Commission or
by Shcherbina personally. He as the chairman made the decisions. But
preparing proposals on what to do fell on my shoulders.
Vorobyov Evgeny Ivanovich, the former Deputy Minister of Health, who was
later removed, his responsibility was to determine the number of people
exposed to radiation, their fate and everything that had to do with people.
And local authorities were a part of the Government Commission. For example,
the head of the district executive committee, Plyushch, had to make
preparations for the evacuation. These words were pronounced immediately and
directly, “Prepare for evacuation.” And to carry out the tasks that I would
define to limit the consequences of the accident.
The first thing to do was reconnaissance. Because the dosimetry service… By
the way, here I will take a detour and say that dosimetry was poorly
organized. Dosimetrists with devices, instead of assault rifles, should have
been everywhere. As I wrote in the proposals: the first perimeter at the
station itself, a second one at a kilometre from the station, then
3-kilometre and 10-kilometre perimeters. Within these, at every 100 metres,
there should have been automatic devices that would generate audio and light
signals in case of excess doses.
Legasov: Yes. But even
was not there in sufficient quantities when we arrived. So the main work was
undertaken by
Abaghian Armen Artavazdovich, the Director of
VNIIAES, the Institute of Atomic Energy Stations, that is presently under the
Ministry of Atomic Energy
and was under the Ministry of Energy earlier.
Adamovich: Abaghian…
Legasov: Armen Artavazdovich, a good man. And, a little later, Egorov from
the Adamov Institute but he arrived a day or two later. They started the
work. Then Pikalov came with his services. Then the dosimetric
reconnaissance began.
On the evening of the 26th, we did everything roughly. However, it was
already clear on the 26th that the reactor was destroyed. And on the 26th,
at 11.11 pm, there was another meeting of the Government Commission that
considered two issues. The first was about the population. And here we had a
sharp debate. Sidorenko Viktor Alekseyevich, who also was a member of the
Government Commission from Gosatomenergonadzor, insisted on an immediate
evacuation of the population. And I supported him. The medics objected. But
the point here is that the procedure that had been established was this. The
permission for evacuation is issued by the
Ministry of Health of USSR; not the Council of Ministers or the Central Committee of the CPSU but the
Ministry of Health.
The rules that they had worked out prior to this accident were as follows.
By the way, there are no international rules even now. But the Ministry of
Health had developed these rules. If there is a danger of a person receiving
a dose of 25
rem
immediately or within a certain amount of time, then the local authorities
have the right to—have the right to but are not required to—carry out an
evacuation. If there is a probability of receiving a dose of 75 rem or more,
then the local authorities are required to carry out an evacuation. So, if
there is no threat of receiving 25 rem, then no one has the right to carry
out an evacuation. Between 25 and 75 rem is a matter for the local
authorities. And above 75 rem, it is mandatory. These were the sanitary
rules that existed at the time. Direct measurements were made in Pripyat.
The explosion happened in such a way that Pripyat was bypassed from both
sides [by the fallout]. Do you understand?
Adamovich: And it went to Belorussia.
Legasov: To Belorussia, one part, and the other went to Ukraine but in the
other direction. And Pripyat appeared, at the time of the explosion, it
appeared to be clean. There were less than 10 rem. This put the medics in a
difficult position. According to their regulations, they did not have the
right to declare an evacuation based on the data available to them at 11 pm.
We, as experts, were saying that—
Adamovich: Tomorrow, there will be…
Legasov: That tomorrow, there will be 25 or more. Therefore, we must declare
the evacuation right away. But that will be tomorrow, and right now there
isn’t. And what if there isn’t [above 25 rem] tomorrow? What if something is
done to the reactor tomorrow and the whole thing is over? How would we feel
then? Would we be breaking the law? Altogether, there was such a lengthy
argument and Shcherbina, to his credit, approved the decision to evacuate.
Buses, urgently organized for the evacuation needs.
The medics did not sign the protocol. They signed it the next day at 11 am.
But since Shcherbina had approved the decision, the local authorities had
promptly begun the preparations. One thousand buses were called from Kiev,
the routes were prepared, and locations where the evacuees would be taken
were determined.
Unfortunately, there was no local broadcasting network to announce this. So
General Berdov, who had arrived from Kiev, ordered that all policemen will
go to every flat and inform that no one should go outdoors until the next
day and should stay at home. Because in the houses, there were no—
Adamovich: So that there was no local…[inaudible]
Legasov: Well, I don’t know. I only know that the population was informed at
night and early in the morning by going to all the flats and placing on
duty—
Adamovich: 27th or...[inaudible]
Legasov: In the morning on the 27th and at night on the 26th.
Nevertheless, on 27th morning, there were women taking a walk with their
children. This meant that they did not have time to inform some of the
people or that they had come from somewhere else. People were going to the
shops and the city was living its semi-usual life. But at 11 am, it was
already fully official. After the medics signed, it was announced that the
city is being evacuated. This showed our inexperience, of some sort...
organisational, I would say.
I understood, I must tell you honestly, that I understood that the city was
being evacuated permanently. But psychologically, somehow, I did not have
the means, the strength, the ability to say this to people. Because I
reasoned, for example, that if we say this to the people now, the evacuation
will be delayed. But the radioactivity was already growing exponentially at
this time. People will start to pack for too long. Do you understand?
Something else will happen. But there was no time. That is why I advised,
and Shcherbina agreed with me, to announce that we cannot tell about the
precise duration of the evacuation yet.
Belongings of the inhabitants of Pripyat and other evacuees. People would tend to take as much as they can if knowing the evacuation is permanent. This could help spread the contamination.
Adamovich: [unintelligible]
Legasov: No, no such duration. He is wrong. Maybe someone understood it this
way but it was announced like so, “Probably for a few days, maybe for a
longer period…” It was announced in an indefinite form but it was announced
in such a way that people could understand that they were leaving their city
for a few days. Do you understand? That is why they packed lightly and left.
Then there was another mistake. Some residents asked to evacuate in their
own cars and there were around 3,000 private cars in the city, around that
number.
Adamovich: [Was it] banned?
Legasov: No, allowed. Boris Yevdokimovich probably made a mistake but it is
hard to say. Say they allowed it and some cars left, some of the residents
left in their own cars, but the cars were, of course, contaminated. On the
other hand, people were contaminated; and their things were contaminated.
Whether it made a big difference is hard to say.
The evacuation itself took place in an exceedingly organized manner. In two
hours, as I recall, 45,000 of all the 51,000 residents were
. Those needed to maintain the city and service the station remained. And
the Government Commission itself remained in Pripyat. During this—this may
not be for publishing or maybe it is—do you know what caught my eye? The
party organisation was removed.
Adamovich: That is?
Legasov: Even during the war, when a retreat was planned from a city, it was
already determined in advance who would remain undercover, who would be with
the army, etc. But here everything was so quick and sudden that…
[Erased]
...there was no one to rely on, that is, the highest party authority. But
this was for a few days, and after a few days, everything, of course,
recovered.
Now, the station personnel, who were supposed to service the 1st and 2nd
blocks in shifts, were transferred 50 kilometres away to the pioneer camp,
Skazochniy. When I arrived there for the first time, I witnessed a grim
scene because the first proper dosimetric posts were set up there. People
were changing clothes. And it was such an unforgettable scene as one drove
up to Skazochniy. Probably, there were a few thousand suits, civilian,
hanging on trees. Because, of course—this is interesting—everyone arrives,
the dosimetrists measure them and everyone’s clothes are contaminated. And I
remember that my Finnish overcoat, which my wife chose for me after much
thought, and my English suit…
Adamovich: On trees…[inaudible]
Legasov: Simply hung up on trees. And there you are, travelling by car for a
long, long time and then you see such a scene in front of you—
Adamovich: Oh, just hung up...[inaudible]
Legasov: Just before Skazochny. It went like this. You approach the gates of
the Skazochniy Pioneer Camp. The dosimetrist measures you. Says, "Undress."
You undress. Take a few steps. You hang your suit on a tree, wherever you
are. You are then given special clothing, like this one, blue or white. And
you go into Skazochniy where you are assigned a bed, living space and other
things. Then the next one arrives and so it goes on.
Adamovich: And then you drove past these suits?
Legasov: Yes, two or three times we went by these suits.
Adamovich: And then?
Legasov: Then they were destroyed, of course.
Adamovich: Destroyed?
Legasov: Of course, later they were all destroyed. Buried and destroyed.
Adamovich: [unintelligible]
Legasov: Leaves an impression. Yes. Like scarecrows all of them were hung.
And there was another episode. Sidorenko and I, when we had moved to
Chernobyl after spending a week in Pripyat, went to a shop—we were supposed
to be the experts—to buy ourselves at least something, new underpants,
undershirts, shirts. Do you understand? Something to change into. This is
underwear that we were dreaming of. We went in and bought ourselves some
very nice shirts. But when we returned to Skazochniy and measured them, they
turned out to be more contaminated than the ones we were wearing. Even
Chernobyl was quite…
Adamovich: [inaudible] ...this is in Chernobyl?
Legasov: Yes, there is contamination in Chernobyl itself.
Adamovich: But people were living in Chernobyl for seven more days.
Legasov: Sometime after the 2nd of May, they started to evacuate them. But
in the end, I have to say this. The evacuation, the order of evacuation,
doesn't matter from Pripyat or Chernobyl, was carried out in such a way
that—it will be better for you if Ilyin or the other doctors say
this—overall among the people who did not work at the station, just lived
there, not a single person was injured because of delaying the evacuation by
at least a day.
Another thing. Many residents later, in six or seven days, were drinking
milk—
Adamovich: Where?
Legasov: Well, somewhere. Say from cows who—
Adamovich: In Chernobyl? [inaudible]
Legasov: In Chernobyl, near it, in your Belorussia, everywhere. Do you
understand? Yes? That is because
Iodine fell out
first. Then the cows ate the grass with Iodine. Then gave us milk when they
were milked later. And then those who drank Iodine, and children, in a large
enough amount, they had greater stress on their thyroid gland. But there was
no external radiation exposure or any other effect, so to say, on those
people that were evacuated. There was nothing.
But coming back to Pripyat... As I said, on the 26th of April, at 11 pm, it
was decided that the people will be evacuated the next day. But my
colleagues and I were faced with the task of what to do next? What to do
next?
Adamovich: Sorry, but the first commission, they must have then called. Was
Shcherbina calling Moscow with you? Didn’t you report to Gorbachev and
others, well, the situation?
Legasov: So, on that day and the following days, there was regular
communication with Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov and
Vladimir Ivanovich Dolgikh. They were communicating, continuously, constantly. As far as I can
imagine, but this is within my ability, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, I
spoke with him three times. And the first time with him—
Adamovich: Well, that’s interesting. What kind of conversation did you have
with him?
Legasov: I probably cannot say because—
Adamovich: I will not write it down.
Legasov: Or I will. Not for the record but for understanding. So, I heard
his first call… When I worked with Shcherbina, I never heard him speaking to
Gorbachev. Whether he was or not, I just don’t know. I won’t lie. But when
Silayev replaced Shcherbina, and I was left, then the entire Commission, the
first composition of it, left.
Adamovich: [unclear]
Legasov: I was left behind. They left me. At first, Sidorenko left me, and
Shcherbina asked me to stay. Then I was called to the Politburo meeting on
the 5th of May. There I reported the situation. Then Silayev called
Gorbachev himself and asked that I go back. So I was caught on the road and,
after the Politburo, sent back again. But these are such personal things.
And so, before the Politburo, before the 5th of May, when Shcherbina had
already left and Silayev had arrived, this was the 3rd or 4th of May, I
heard the first call from Gorbachev to Silayev and his conversation with
him. This was the first one.
Were there conversations between Shcherbina and Gorbachev? I don’t think so.
I think there were no conversations in the initial days but I may be wrong.
Also, I think that Gorbachev’s first call to Silayev was sometime after the
May holidays, on the 3rd or 4th of May. And I spoke with Mikhail Sergeyevich
in the second, third and fourth calls. Velikhov spoke with him once, in my
presence, on the situation. That was it. But usually, Ryzhkov and Dolgikh
were in constant communication. They, so to say, maintained this connection.
Adamovich: [weakly and hardly understandable] But what did Gorbachev ask
you…tell you…
No, I am turning off my—
[Recording interrupted]
Legasov: ...The director of ChNPP was in shock, from beginning to end.
Adamovich: [unclear]
Legasov: I saw him on the first day I arrived there. His last name was
Bryukhanov,
the director of the station. The last time I saw him was in the Politburo
[transcript of the Politburo meeting] when the cause of the Chernobyl accident was
being discussed. That’s where he was questioned. He was in shock all of the
time. Not one sensible action or word could he utter. So he was in shock.
What he is as a person and why he was in shock there… but there, he was an
incapacitated man.
At the same time, Shasharin, the First Deputy Minister of Energy, under whom
the station was at the time, was at a loss. He was at a loss because for
him, the situation was, how do you say, not planned for. It was not clear
what to do in it. And so he sought our help all the time on what to do. But
he acted very eagerly and selflessly.
I will end here all my manipulations with you, so to say—there is a lot of
talk about it—the logic, so the logic behind the decisions that were made is
clear to you. The logic behind the adopted decisions was as follows.
We had to introduce an element that would absorb heat due to chemical energy
and transform, in the same way we boil tea, would take away the heat and so
on. Initially, I suggested dropping iron shot. Firstly, because it would
melt and a sufficient amount of energy would be spent in melting it.
Secondly, it would ensure that the heat transfers to the metal structures
and then they would transfer the heat to the air faster. But the iron shot
that we found at the station was contaminated with radioactivity. So it was
impossible to load it into the helicopters, first of all. Second, at the
high temperatures that we had measured at some points, the process would get
reversed. The iron would oxidize and the temperatures would rise further
still.
Adamovich: [unclear]
Legasov: That is why this option was discarded. For the places where the
temperature was relatively low, say 200, 300, 400 degrees [Celsius], lead
was used. It would melt there, absorb the heat and also act as a protective
shield to some extent. At the same time, it would also be a kind of
heat-conducting element. And we even thought that it would partially
evaporate, cool down in the higher area and then flow down again. You know,
sort of similar to Freon circulation in refrigerators. This would facilitate
heat transfer. That's probably what happened.
I repeat, then there was a lot of talk about lead poisoning. But now they
are preparing for me a precise report of analyses of all the soils from both
within the 30-kilometre zone and beyond it. All that has been given to me so
far shows no difference from Moscow to Minsk or anywhere else. Lead is
everywhere but it is the one that comes from exhaust gases of vehicles. Do
you understand? There is no excess. And doctors have never found any trace
of lead in the people who were directly working there. That is idle talk;
even though it is so very widespread.
We dropped dolomite there. That’s magnesium carbonate. It also decomposes
the same way. The heat was absorbed and it broke down into magnesium oxide
and carbon dioxide, which in turn reduced the supply of oxygen, as it is in
firefighting. Do you follow? And magnesium oxide, the most heat-conducting
of all ceramics, similarly carried the heat away.
And finally, sand. It played the role of iron but without the oxidisation.
If the temperature is high, it melts and absorbs heat. Sand played a double
role. On the one hand, it melted and we did find evidence of that. And it
used the heat from the reactor to melt. It took away the heat so that the
uranium won’t melt. Moreover, we added clay just for filtering. Whatever
radioactive particles would escape, they would be filtered out. So the
radioactive particles were filtered out by this layer. As western experts
have shown after our report at the
IAEA…
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